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Abstract— The proliferation of the "Internet of Things" (IoT) and its applications have 
affected every aspect of human endeavors from smart manufacturing, agriculture, 
healthcare, and transportation to homes. The smart home is vulnerable to malicious 
attacks due to memory constraint which inhibits the usage of traditional antimalware and 
antivirus software. This makes the application of traditional cryptography for its security 
impossible. This work aimed at securing Smart home devices, by developing an enhanced 
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA). The enhancement on TEA was to get rid of its 
vulnerabilities of related-key attacks and weakness of predictable keys to be usable in 
securing smart devices through entropy shifting, stretching, and mixing technique. The 
Enhanced Tiny Encryption Algorithm for Smart Home devices (ETEASH) technique was 
benchmarked with the original TEA using the Runs test and avalanche effect. ETEASH 
successfully passed the Runs test with the significance level of 0.05 for the null 
hypothesis, and the ETEASH avalanche effect of 58.44% was achieved against 52.50% 
for TEA. These results showed that ETEASH is more secured in securing smart home 
devices than the standard TEA. 
Keywords/Index Terms—Internet of Things, Cryptography, Smart home, Tiny 
encryption algorithm, and Pseudo random number generators 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the Internet of Things 
(IoT) with its potentials has positively 
affected every aspect of human 
endeavors, ranging from manufacturing, 
agriculture, healthcare, businesses, 
logistics, government, cities, and homes 
(Raggett, 2016). IoT generally refers to 
scenarios where network connectivity 
and computing capability extend to 
objects, sensors, and everyday items, 
which might not necessarily be 
considered computers, allowing these 
devices to generate, exchange and 
consume data with minimal human 
intervention (Rose et al., 2015; 
Buenrostro et al., 2018).  
Smart home as an area of application of 
IoT, inclusive of the smart city, 
community, and grid (Alagbe et al., 
2019), is a network of connected devices 
in human living environment, which 
communicate remotely with the 
inhabitants to raise their living and 
quality of life, the efficiency of energy 
consumed and their safety. The smart 
city is a network of connected cities, 
locations, or infrastructures to improve 
the quality of life (Souza et al., 2020). 
The wireless broadcast nature of the 
smart home makes it vulnerable to series 
of attacks such as eavesdropping, replay 
attacks, and man in the middle (Zhang et 
al., 2017). This era of connected 
devices, the world is drifting to, makes 
IoT a worthwhile subject to build a 
career on (Misra, 2020). 
Examining existing works, for securing 
the smart home, a microcontroller 
driven by GSM module and handset, 
with access password, alerting 
homeowners of any intrusion with the 
aid of SMS, buzzer and LED was used 
(Hasan et al., 2015). The access control could 
be brute-forced.  Zandamela (2017) proposed 
a system that makes available the security 
reports of the home to the homeowner, 
through GSM mobile technology and 
Arduino. This proposed solution is a reactive 
one. Abu et al (2018) equipped home devices 
with Passive Infrared and Infrared sensors 
which capture intruders’ motion and sends it 
to the homeowners. This proposal does not 
have access control. 
Most work examined proposed solution that 
is reactive instead of preventive, and that 
could be brute-forced. This work proposes a 
system that works, not minding the presence 
of adversaries. IoT is ubiquitous partly as a 
result of its usage of the existing technologies 
such as Wireless Sensor Networks, Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) (Oluwu et 
al., 2020), and Cloud computing which 
serves as a ready platform for its 
communication. Traditional cryptographic 
security measures cannot be applied to the 
low-capacity devices known as constrained 
IoT devices. Flexible security infrastructure 
is hence needed for the IoT such as 
Lightweight Cryptographic algorithm 
(Usman et al., 2017). Lightweight 
cryptographic algorithms are designed to 
function in constrained devices such as 
sensors, health-care devices, RFID tags, and 
contactless smart cards, securing them 
through cryptographic keys. The strength of 
a cryptographic key depends on the degree of 
how hard it is to guess. The degree of 
hardness of a key depends on the degree of 
randomness used in generating the key 
(Vassilev & Hall, 2014). Generating random 
numbers is essential to cryptography, and 
generating true random information is the 
most crucial cryptographic algorithm to 
effectively aid in security key management 
(Hughes & Nordholt, 2016). 
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This work through generated 
cryptographic keys addresses issues of 
vulnerabilities and weakness of TEA to 
enhance its security capability against 
threats and security issues in smart 
devices in the smart home environment. 
This paper is structured in five sections. 
Section 1 introduces the work, section 
two examines related works, section 3 
gives the methodology and techniques 
used in this work, while section 4 
discusses the result and section 5 
concludes and gives recommendations. 
2. Related Works 
The smart home is one of the 
applications of IoT. There are several 
smart devices designed and developed 
based on IoT. IoT provides smart home 
devices the ability to sense, monitor, and 
record pertinent data about home 
environments. Characteristically, the 
smart home can be conceptualized into 
three namely (Kumar & Mittal, 2019): 
1) Comfort, 2) Monitoring, and 3) 
Security, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Smart home categorization 
into fields using services 
In the “monitoring category,” the 
homeowner can monitor the home and 
the environment remotely and able to 
call for assistance if there is an intrusion. 
The last category has to do with securing 
the home, the devices, and access to 
confidential information through 
authentication, access control, and 
encryption processes. It is estimated that 
80% of smart devices are vulnerable to 
spectrums of attacks ranging from privacy, 
data, and identity theft, Permanent Denial of 
Service (PDoS), man-in-the-middle, 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) to 
device hijacking (Rambus, 2019). All these 
spectrums of security challenges are 
categorized into three broad categories, 
namely: Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability (CIA), known as CIA of 
information security (Mohammed et al., 
2017). Figure 2 shows the CIA architecture 
for information security. 
2.1 Data Grouping 
The smart home as an application of IoT is 
faced with series of threats and security 
challenges jeered at compromising 
homeowners’ privacy (Yassein et al., 2019). 
A three-layer IoT architecture also called the 
basic layer was proposed by Zeadally et al., 
(2019). These layers are: application, 
network, and sensing layers, and these layers 
are responsible for processing, transmission, 
and perception respectively. Figure 3 
illustrates the Basic layer or three-layer IoT 
architecture. 
 
Figure 2. Architecture of CIA 
In IoT and smart home environments, 
information and data are communicated by 
users and smart devices through unsecured 
public communication channels which are 
linked with the internet (Ajao et al. 2018). 
These exposed the smart home to several 
cyber-attacks and threats such as Denial of 
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Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS), Permanent Denial of 
Service (PDoS), man-in-the-middle, 
privacy, data, and identity theft 
(Rambus, 2019). Other possible threats 
to smart homes are replay attacks, 
device cloning, device tampering, 
privacy breach, information disclosure, 
signal injection, spoofing, routing, and 
signal injection (Ali et al., 2019). 
Security in IoT and smart home is 
examined using Figure 4, based on three-
layer IoT architecture ranging from sensing 
or perception layer (IoT devices), then, 
network layer (communication channels) and 
application layer (cloud computing, 
intelligent traffic, and smart home) (Zeadally 
et al., 2019). The three layers and their 
peculiar securities challenges are thus 
discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
 
Figure 3. Basic Layer of IoT Architecture 
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Figure 4. IoT Security Architecture 
2.2 Data Gathering  
In this layer, sensors collect information 
about, or of users. The sensors are attached 
to the materials or objects to collect 
information as sound, vibration, location, 
humidity, and motion as the need arises 
(Burhan et al., 2018). Some of the sensors 
or technology used here, to collect 
information are; wearable devices, RFID, 
WSN, Global Positioning System (GPS), 
Robust Secure Network (RSN), video 
games, and surveillance camera (Rao et al., 
2018), (Burhan et al., 2018), (Popoola et 
al., 2017). The information collected by 
the sensors at this layer can be shared or 
hacked by hackers for illegal purposes. 
Some of the threats and attacks at this layer 
(Burhan et al., 2018) are: 
1. Node Capturing: This is one of the 
deadly attacks that can be meted on 
the perception layer. It’s a scenario 
when a node is captured, and the 
hacker can have access to confidential 
resources and information on the 
node. If control of a key node such as 
a gateway is taken over by a hacker, 
then information leakage between 
nodes may occur. Key used for secure 
communication and information on 
authentication and access codes 
stored in the gateway’s memory may 
also be compromised. 
2. Fake and Malicious Node: This is an 
attack where the attacker adds a fake 
node in the Home Area Network 
(HAN) with fake inputs to stop the 
transmission of real data. The fake 
node consumes the vital energy of 
normal nodes on the network and 
ultimately halts or destroys the 
network.   
3. Eavesdropping: This is a situation 
where an attacker in real-time 
intercepts unauthorized 
communication such as fax 
communication, text messages, video 
conferencing, and calls as a result of 
unsecured transmission over the 
network. 
Oluwade, et al CJICT (2021) 8(2) 1-15  
URL: http://journals.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/index.php/cjict 
                                                                                                                    6 
 
4. Timing Attack: This occurs in devices 
whose computing capabilities are not 
strong; hence attackers can explore 
their vulnerabilities by studying how 
long it takes for the devices to respond 
to queries received. 
5. Replay Attack: This attack occurs 
when a hacker eavesdrops on the 
communication between sender and 
receiver. Authentic information and 
identity can be seized from the sender 
to deceive the receiver. The 
correctness of information sent by the 
hacker may not be discovered by the 
receiver, since the information is 
encrypted. 
6. Node cloning: This is a scenario 
where the identification information 
of a node or RFID tag is captured. The 
captured node or tag identification 
information is then compromised and 
can be replicated posing serious 
threats to the smart home network 
(Suchitra & Vandana, 2016). 
2.3 IoT Network Layer and Its Security 
Challenges 
This layer is also known as the 
transmission or transport layer, serving as a 
connector between the perception layer and 
the application layer (Burhan et al., 2018). 
It transmits the information sensed by 
sensors which are physical objects through 
communication channels that could be 
wired or wireless. This layer is responsible 
for linking smart devices, network devices, 
and networks to each other. With this 
make-up, the network layer is vulnerable to 
series of threats and attacks relating to 
authentication and integrity of information. 
Some of the common security threats here 
are: 
1. Man-in-The-Middle Attack: This is 
when an attacker intercepts and 
interferes with the communication 
between two communicating smart 
devices getting confidential 
information (Rao et al., 2018). 
2. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack: This 
attack hinders the legitimate users of 
smart devices and network resources, 
the access to services and network 
resources by flooding the target 
devices or resources with redundant 
or legitimate-like requests to make the 
device or resources inaccessible by 
authenticated users (Burhan et al., 
2018) (Shaikh et al., 2019). 
3. Wormhole Attack: In this attack, a 
tunnel is formed between two 
malicious nodes which enhance the 
transmission of packets between the 
two nodes. These two nodes feigned 
closeness which deceives neighboring 
nodes to forward packets through 
them. This leads to more time-
consuming because of the longer time 
of packet transmission (Bhosale and 
Sonavane, 2018). It may also lead to 
packets or information hijacking.  
4. Sybil Attack: The attacker creates 
several multiple fake identities to 
manipulate real nodes on the network. 
The created pseudo identities subvert 
the identification of nodes and 
thereby facilitating access of 
malicious nodes to the network 
(Alharbi et al., 2018). There is a threat 
to the privacy of connected nodes and 
users on the network in the Sybil 
attack. 
5. Spoofing: In a spoofing attack, the 
genuine node is blocked by a hacking 
node, pretending to be the genuine 
node. The hacking node waits for an 
opportunity to capture the credentials 
for the genuine node’s authentication. 
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The genuine device or user’s 
credentials stealthily captured can 
now be used to control the genuine 
device (Ling et al., 2017). 
6. Gateway Attack: This attack is aimed 
at establishing disconnection between 
the nodes and the internet facility. 
This attack could also be routing or 
DoS in nature, where false or empty 
information is received by the node 
from the internet (Rao et al., 2018).  
7. Spear phishing (Gupta, et. al., 2018): 
with this phishing attack, attackers 
pose as authentic company owner by 
using some of the features of the 
authentic and target sites to trick 
customers into giving out their 
personal and confidential 
information. 
 
2.4 Application Layer and Its Security 
Challenges 
The application layer hosts all applications 
in which IoT is deployed. Some of the 
applications in which IoT is deployed are 
smart home, smart health, smart city, and 
smart grid. The Application layer provides 
varying services to the various IoT 
applications, depending on the type of 
information gathered by the perception or 
sensing nodes of the Perception layer 
(Burhan et al., 2018). Smart home as an 
application of IoT has threats and 
vulnerabilities associated with it. Hence the 
Application layer has security challenges 
that are from within and without. The main 
security challenge threats could affect life, 
data, and information confidentiality, and 
integrity. Implementation of security in the 
smart home environment is a key issue 
because of its constrained nature. Some of 
the security challenges in this layer are: 
1. Malicious Code Attack: The 
attacker injects malicious code into 
a smart device to have total control 
of the IoT system (Abdul-Ghani et 
al., 2018). 
2. Phishing Attacks: This attack is 
aimed at getting access to users 
secured sensitive data, through 
access to their passwords, credit 
card, and other confidential 
information. This could be achieved 
through email hacking by sending 
fraudulent mails emails that appear 
to have originated from a trusted 
known source (Abdul-Ghani et al., 
2018). 
3. Software Defenselessness: This is 
when non-standard software written 
by a programmer is used within the 
network. This could increase the 
probability of vulnerabilities of the 
entire network and high chances of 
hacker’s attack (Rao et al., 2018). 
4. Social Engineering: In social 
engineering, the users in IoT setup 
are manipulated into disclosing their 
sensitive and confidential 
information for attackers’ malicious 
acts (Abdul-Ghani et al., 2018). 
This paper addresses smart home security in 
the context of information security. Several 
works in literature addressed the issue of 
smart home security. In Hossain et al., 
(2014) three requirements were provided to 
access smart devices in a Smart home: NFC 
tag, Password, and PIR motion sensor. 
Entrance into the home without the 
fulfillment of the three implies intrusion, 
and an alert is made by a high-intensity 
buzzer. The anomaly of this proposed work 
is that it does not have remote notification 
or remote alerting. This implies that, while 
not at home, and there is an intrusion, the 
homeowner would not be alerted. 
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Hasan et al., (2015) proposed securing a 
home with a microcontroller driven by a 
GSM module and handset, access password, 
alerting homeowners of intrusion with the 
aid of SMS, buzzer, and LED. The access 
control, a 4x4 keypad, and a mobile phone 
could be brute forced or compromised 
respectively.  
Also, Zandamela, (2017) proposed a system 
that makes available the home security 
reports to the homeowner in absence with 
the aid of GSM mobile technology, 
Arduino, and the internet. The combination 
of these three made a monitoring website to 
be set up to receive real-time videos to 
monitor intrusion, motion, and fire 
outbreak. It could be observed, that the 
proposed is a reactive measure, reacting to 
incidence occurrence instead of preventive. 
Abu et al., (2018) in their work equipped 
home devices with Passive Infrared (PIR) 
and Infrared (IR) sensors which capture 
motions and send them to the server through 
Blynk, an application on the devices. The 
sensed data received is sent to an internet-
enabled microcontroller, which alerts the 
homeowner in real-time. The observation on 
this work is the absence of provision for 
access control. Pavithra (2019) proposed an 
automated monitoring system, that monitors 
the home for humans’ presence and sends an 
alert message and call to Global System for 
Mobile Communication (GSM) phone 
number. This intrusion is also displayed on 
a Liquid Crystal Display (LCD). This work 
focused mainly on monitoring the home for 
intrusion. Another observation in this work 
is the use of a GSM phone number for 
alerting the homeowner. If the homeowner 
lost this phone number, then he would be 
unable to monitor the home. This could be 
disastrous to sudden time-critical events. In 
their work Karimi & Krit, (2019) proposed 
two methods that can be used for smart 
home security to address threats other than 
methods used by those examined in this 
literature review that made use of 
microcontrollers, GSM, and smartphones. 
The proposed methods are 1) Data 
encryption and 2) Network monitoring. 
Karim & Krit (2019) on “data encryption” 
suggested a combination of algorithms or 
developing a new algorithm for better 
security of data in transmission, while on 
network “monitoring,” they proposed 
implementation of Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS), usage of smart gateway and 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) having 
firewalls. 
Having reviewed works on smart home 
security that had to utilize, microprocessors, 
GSM modules, phones, sending SMS or 
calls, at securing the smart home, 
contributions have also been made in the 
context of user authentication and data 
encryption in literature. The smart home is a 
conglomeration of heterogeneous devices 
such as sensors, medical devices, and RFID 
tags which are constrained devices, having 
little or no memory capacity, low-capacity 
energy source or battery-powered and low 
processing capability (Jordi et al., 2017), 
communicating with one another, unaided 
by humans. These constrained devices or 
smart devices would require flexible 
security infrastructure such as Lightweight 
cryptography to cater to their low resources 
(Oluwade et al., 2018).  
Cryptography is a technique traditionally 
used in securing data on transit or at rest 
stored in storage devices. Traditional 
cryptography cannot secure low-capacity 
IoT devices, called constrained devices; 
hence lightweight cryptography was 
designed to be used on constrained devices 
(Oluwade, et al., 2018). Key generation, 
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management, and encryptions are important 
aspects of cryptography ((Zhang et al., 
2017). Shaikh et al., (2019) in their work 
pointed out that solution to eavesdropping 
and unauthorized insertion of messages to a 
network are message authentication, public-
key cryptography, and symmetric key 
encryption techniques.  
This work proposed an enhancement to the 
traditional Tiny Encryption Algorithm in a 
manner to secure home by securing 
information not minding the adversaries 
through information encryption compared 
to existing works which require four digits 
as a passcode to access the smart home, or 
use of SMS to alert the homeowner of 
intrusion to the home. The use of a passcode 
poses security risks to the home because the 
username or passcode could be predicted 
through brute-force attack and SMS might 
delay in delivery to alert of intrusion or 
might not be delivered at all due to bad 
network of the telecommunication 
company. 
An existing work that lags when compared 
with this work made use of home 
monitoring videos sent over the internet to 
the homeowner wherever he is (Das et al., 
2011). Kim et al., (2011) used social 
networking platforms to gain access to the 
home.  Authors in El-Shafee & Hamed, 
(2012) use a username with the password to 
monitor and control home appliances. Home 
monitoring could be looped over the internet 
if cameras are not secured, while hackers 
could spoof relationships on social 
networking platforms to gain access to the 
home. Username with the password could 
be predicted and hence the security of the 
home could be compromised. The summary 
of related works is in Table 1. The 
confidentiality of information in smart 
homes is investigated in this work by 
hardening encryption keys through entropy 
generation to provide enough security for 
the smart home. The strength of a 
cryptographic key depends on the degree of 
how hard it is to guess. The degree of 
hardness of a key depends on the degree of 
randomness used in generating the key 
(Vassilev & Hall, 2014). Generating 
random numbers is essential to 
cryptography, and generating true random 
information is the most crucial 
cryptographic algorithm to effectively aid in 
security key management. This work 
improves on Tiny Encryption Algorithm 
(TEA) by overcoming its notable drawback 
of weak crypto keys. 
2.5 Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA)  
To efficiently ensure security in the smart 
home, a lightweight cryptographic 
algorithm is needed because it is specifically 
designed for constrained devices. There are 
lightweight cryptographic algorithms that 
may be used on constrained devices to 
produce good security but with less 
processing power, time, and memory than 
symmetric cryptographic algorithms such as 
PRESENT, HEIGHT, TEA, Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES), and RC5 (Shifa 
et al., 2019). TEA stands out of the listed 
symmetric algorithm because of its short 
software codes aside from its other features 
which other symmetric algorithms have. 
This feature of shortcodes made TEA 
suitable for the development of embedded 
systems (Abdulsalam et al., 2018). 
However, with these strong features of 
TEA, it has a weakness, that should be 
corrected for its strength to be fully 
optimized. 
The weakness of TEA is in its simplicity of 
encryption keys, which makes it vulnerable 
to equivalent key attacks (De Leon et al., 
2019). This work aimed at enhancing TEA 
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to improve its security performance. Tiny 
Encryption Algorithm (TEA), originally 
designed by Wheeler and Needham is a 
small (tiny), and fast simple 
cryptographically strong algorithm with 
short software codes and small footprint as 
regards its memory occupation when stored 
in a device and seamlessly fit into any 
program on any computer (Shoeb & Gupta, 
2013). These features of TEA made it 
suitable for security enhancement on 
constrained devices, which are appliances or 
nodes in IoT and smart home networks (De 
Leon et al., 2019).  
The TEA’s characteristics of block cipher, 
simplicity in codes of few lines, and 
implementation were achieved by making 
simple and weak, its basic operations 
(Shoeb & Gupta, 2013). Security challenges 
are overcome by repeating the basic 
operations repeatedly (Shoeb & Gupta, 
2013). A credit to TEA is its high speed in 
encryption processes, but notable 
drawbacks of TEA are its use of “equivalent 
keys” which weakens its key length 
effectiveness and only requires complexity 
O(2ˆ32) which is even much lesser than the 
effort 2ˆ128 required for brute force attack 
to break the key.  
The other notable drawback is that there is 
no known standard to which TEA is 
measured as regards the codes’ length 
(Shoeb & Gupta, 2013). 
The TEA is a Feistel cipher whose operation 
utilizes mixed algebraic groups, which are 
XOR, ADD and SHIFT. This operation 
utilizes the twin properties of Shannon – 
diffusion, and confusion which are 
important for the block cipher. TEA 
encrypts 64bits data at a time by using a 
128-bit key and it’s highly resistant to 
differential attacks. Related key attacks are 
possible with TEA, though its mixing 
portion seems to be okay (Kumar et al., 
2015).  
In TEA’s basic operation, 32 rounds of TEA 
would be completed for every encrypted 64-
bit block. Diffusion works to hide any 
statistical information between the plaintext 
and the ciphertext that may serve as a 
backdoor to the attackers, while confusion 
ensures that the statistical information 
between the ciphertext and the encryption 
key is kept secure, to thwart any effort of the 
attackers to discover the key (Abdelhalim et 
al., 2013). Diffusion and confusion are 
achieved in Feistel Cipher Structure as 
illustrated in Figure 1 through the use of 
substitution and permutation.  
The substitution (addition, XOR’ing, and 
shifting) operation is performed on the left 
(L) of the plaintext, while Permutation 
operation is swapping at every round, of 
both halves of the plaintext. TEA has a 128-
bit key which is divided into four, to give 
32-bits keyword length K[0], K[1], K[2], 
K[3] as in Figure 5) that work on a 64-bit 
data block that is split into two 32-bit blocks 
called L and R (Left and Right side of the 
data block). The operations in the first half 
of the first round of TEA as in Figure 5 are: 
R has a left shift of 4 and is then added to 
K[0], it is added to Delta [(√5-1)*231], and 
passes through a right shift 5 and is added to 
K[1].  
The three XOR operation applied to their 
result to obtained R for the next Feistel 
round because at this time, swap is carried 
out on R and L. Figure 5 shows a Single 
Round TEA with 2 Feistel Operations. 
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Figure 5.  A Single Round TEA with 2 
Feistel Operations 
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Table 1. Summary of Related Works 
S/No. Author(s)/Work Strength Weakness Remark 
1. i. Das, et al. (2011). 
ii. Kim, et al. (2011). 
a. Utilized GPRS, 
Client-server 
communication with 
iOS application on 
phone. Motion sensors, 
cameras used to notify 
intrusion through 
internet 
b. Utilized social 
network  
platforms, SMS logs 
and  
call logs, for security 
a. Videos of home 
could be looped by 
hackers over the 
internet if cameras are  
not secured properly 
b. Hackers could 
spoof  
relationship on social  
networking platforms 
to gain access to the 
home 
a. Device  
hijacking attack. 
 
b. Unauthorized  
access Attack  







Prone to Brute 
force attack 
3. Hasan et al., (2015). Securing home with 
access password and 
alerting homeowners of 
intrusion. 
Key lock combination 
could be brute-forced 
Brute-force 
attack 
4. Zandamela, (2017). Sends real-time video 
and  
GSM-based information 
of home intrusions, 
motion and fire 
detections 





5. Abu et al., (2018). Monitors intrusion by  
sending alert report to 
the  
home owner 
No provision for 
access control 
 
Node tapering  
and Physical 
damage attacks 
6. Pavithra, (2019) Automatically monitors 
human presence and 
sends alert through 
Mobile communication 
GSM 
Loss or weak 
communication 
network and loss of 






7. Karimi & Krit, 
(2019) 
Data encryption This is good Data encryption 
is good 
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3. Methodology 
The methodology involved the 
development of Entropy Generation 
Technique (EGT), ETEASH, and 
configuration of raspberry pi as router 
or access point and integration of 
modem/dongle on the raspberry pi. 
The methodology is segmented into 
Entropy Generation Technique, the 
Modula steps taken in achieving the 
technique, the algorithms involved in 
the technique, and the integration of 
the EGT to TEA giving Enhanced 
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (ETEA). 
The smart home was designed using 
raspberry pi3 as the access point for 
the home network. The next segment 
addresses the application of ETEA to 
the smart home, giving secured smart 
home, with a generic name: 
“Enhanced Tiny Encryption 
Algorithm for Secured Smart Home” 
(ETEASH) while the last segment is 
the tests carried out on EGT and 
ETEASH. The taxonomy of the 
methodology in realizing smart home 
security is in two divides as depicted 
in Figure 6. The divides are TEA 
enhancement and raspberry pi 
enhancement or configuration. TEA 
enhancement divide starts with 
Entropy Generation Technique, to, 
the test of the randomness of random 
numbers generated. EGT is 
incorporated into TEA to give ETEA. 
Performance evaluation was carried 
out on ETEA, compared with TEA. 
On the raspberry pi enhancement 
divide, the smart home was designed 
with the aid of a configured raspberry 
pi 3 as an access point or router. 
Incorporation of ETEA from the TEA 
enhancement divide to the designed 
smart home on the raspberry pi 
enhancement divide yielded a secured 
smart home, resulting in an Enhanced 
Tiny Encryption Algorithm for 
secured smart home (ETEASH). 
Figure 7 shows Smart Home secured 
with the Enhanced TEA (ETEA), 
with the ETEA components spelled 
out as EGT and TEA. 
 
Figure 7. Smart Home Secured with 
Enhanced TEA (ETEA) 
3.1 A Secured Smart Home and 
Configuration  
The smart home with smart appliances 
connected with Wi-Fi, in a network 
known as Home Area Network (HAN) 
is shown in Figure 8. Raspberry Pi3 
serves as the access point/router for the 
HAN. Modem/hotspot/Ethernet 
connects the raspberry to the internet; 
this invariably connects the entire 
smart home to the internet. The 
Raspberry Pi 3 was used in this 
research as a router or access point to 
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which all the smart devices are 
connected wirelessly.  
The software that made this possible: 
HostAPD and ISC-DHCP-server are 
installed on the raspberry pi 3. A 
smartphone is used for controlling and 
monitoring the smart home. The 
secured smart home architectural 
design is illustrated in Figure 8. This is 
made up of the smart home and ETEA 
which is the smart home security 
component. The smart device 
messages or credentials are encrypted, 
and so with the integration of 
ETEASH, the smart home is secured 
from attacks. The smart hub, which is 
the raspberry pi 3 is the point of 
reference for data flow in the secured 
smart home. The directions of arrows 
from Figure 9 show the flow of data 
from one device to the other. The bi-
directional arrows imply that the 
device can communicate, and it can be 
communicated to.  
3.2 Hardware Components Design 
The hardware components used consist 
of the raspberry pi 3, modem/dongle, 
and smartphone. The interconnection 
of these hardware devices gave the 
research work a physical structure. The 
raspberry pi 3 is the major hardware in 
this research, and the configuration is 
as shown in Table 2, while Table 3 
shows the modem/dongle 
specification.    
 
Figure 9. Data Flow between Smart 
Components 
The modem/dongle serves as the link 
between the internet and the home area 
network. It provides internet service to 
the raspberry. Hotspot from a mobile 
device with internet service could be 
used alternatively. The smartphone or 
a personal computer (PC) as hardware 
serves as an access control unit from 
which communication to the smart 
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Table 2 Raspberry Pi 3 Specification 
S/NO FEATURES FEATURES’ 
DETAILS 
1 Soc BCM2837 





4 RAM 1GB SDRAM 
5 Storage Micro-SD 
6 Ethernet 10/100 
7 Wireless 802.11n/Bluetooth 
4.0 
8 Video Output HDMI/Composite 
9 Audio Output HDMI/Headphone 








3.3 Entropy Generation Technique  
The Java programming language codes 
and C++ codes were the internal 
components of the Entropy Generation 
Technique (EGT). The random number 
generating tools were carefully 
selected from the two programming 
languages. Pseudorandom number 
generating tools in C++ and C, are: 
rand() and srand(). Anytime encryption 
is made, four random numbers of 32 
bits (concatenated to give 128 bits) are 
randomly picked from the generated 
random numbers, to serve as the 
encryption keys in the ETEASH. 
Mathematically, for an attacker to be 
able to break the hardness of the 
encryption keys, if 2000 random 
numbers were generated, will be: 
i. 2^2000 for the pick of 1st encryption 
key from 2000 randomly generated 
keys 
ii. 2^2000 for the pick of 2nd encryption 
key from 2000 randomly generated 
keys 
iii. 2^2000 for the pick of 3rd encryption 
key from 2000 randomly generated 
keys” 
iv. 2^2000 for the pick of 4th encryption 
key from 2000 randomly generated 
keys” 






 of breaking the 
encryption keys of ETEASH for all 
four keys is: 2^2000 x 2^2000 x 2^2000 x 
2^2000. 
The functionality of rand() in 
generating entropies yields a similar 
sequence of entropies, while srand() 
yields a better random sequence of 
numbers, which leads to the adoption 
of srand() for Pool1 (C++). There are 
four random number generating tools 
in Java, which are: java.util.random, 
java.security.SecureRandom, 
/dev/urandom and  OpenSSL*API. 
SecureRandom was adopted for the 
Pool2 (Java) component because it is 
cryptographically strong. Three steps 
of procedures are involved in EGT to 
have ETEASH developed, to enhance 
its hardness. These are: “Entropy 
shifting, stretching, and mixing” 
1. Module 1 - Entropy Shifting 
The theory behind entropy shifting is the 
movement of entropy from a pool 1 (storage 
1) of entropy to another pool 2 (storage 2) of 
Table 3 Modem/Dongle Specification 
S/NO FEATURES’ DETAILS 
1 HSUPA USB Stick 
2 Model MF110 
3 ZTE Corporation  
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entropy. This movement causes depletion of 
entropy in pool 1 and increment of entropy 
in pool 2. Java written codes serve as pool 1, 
while codes in C++ serve as pool 2. Entropy 
is generated using the random number 
generation function in C++ seeded with the 
system’s time function. The generated 
entropy in pool 1 is then Entropy stretching” 
and “Entropy mixing”. The steps are 
discussed in Module 1, Module 2, and 
Module 3 respectively. The design flowchart 
for the EGT is shown in Figure 10. Two 
rounds of random numbers generation from 
pool 1 and pool 2 are ORed together. The 
first round is placed in C1, while the second 
round is placed in C2. This is “Entropy 
shifting” “Entropy stretching” is achieved 
by concatenating C1and C2 of rounds 1 and 
2 to obtain D1. A repeat of “Entropy 
shifting” and “Entropy stretching” is done to 
obtain D2. Entropy mixing is achieved by 
XORed of D1 with D2. The resultant 
entropy H, (D.D) is the key K used on TEA 
shifted to pool 2. The algorithm for entropy 







Figure 10. Entropy Generation 
Technique 









   /* from pool 1 
Call seed function  /* from pool 2 









Shifting (adding Bi to Ai) 
Else 
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Shifting (adding Bi to Ai) 
 
2. Module 2 - Entropy Stretching 
Pool 2 through a “Call Function” calls 
the entropy generated in pool 1. Pool 
2 and Pool 1 entropies are 
concatenated (this is stretching). By 
stretching, the numbers of bits 
increase from 64bits to 128bits.  This 
increases the time it takes to predict 
(if possible) the content of the 
entropy. Algorithm 2 has the 
algorithm for Entropy Stretching. 
 
Algorithm 2 Entropy-Stretching  
3j  
For 1j  
1211 )( CCD    /* Entropy-stretching      
(concatenating C2 to C1) to have 
entropy with higher bits) 
Else 
2212 )( CCD   /* Entropy-stretching 
(concatenating C2 with C1) to have 
entropy with higher bits) 
 
3. Module 3 – Entropy-Mixing 
The processes: entropy shifting and 
entropy stretching go through two 
rounds, and their resulting entropies 
which are entropy stretching(s) are 
XORed together to achieve “Entropy 
Mixing”.  The algorithm for Entropy 
Mixing is as shown in Algorithm 3. 







3.4 Enhanced Tiny Encryption 
Algorithm (ETEA)  
The integration of EGT to TEA solved 
the problem of related keys and 
predictable keys attacks in TEA. The 
EGT produces a new set of four keys 
every time encryption is to be done. 
Figure 11 shows the structure of the 
ETEASH. 
Table 4 Entropy Mixing – Mixing Bytes 
Activity  Byte 
Entropy stretched  
result round 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Entropy stretched  
result round 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Final Entropy to 
be  
sent to TEA 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Algorithm 3 Entropy-Mixing  
Input:  DH &  
Output: H  
Start: Initialize Reseeding 
0R  
For 3k  
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Figure 11. The Structure of the ETEA 
The EGT is made up of Entropy 
shifting, stretching, and mixing. We 
have two pools of the source of 
entropies A and B which are our basic 
sources of EGT creation. 
The Formation of Entropy Shifting: 
The Entropy from pool A called A1 
(16-bits) and pool B called B1(16-bits) 
are or ORed together to give C1. This 
is repeated and this gives A2 (16-bits) 
and B2 (16-bits), ORed, giving C2 (16-
bits). The resulting bits C1 and C2 are 
16-bits. 
Entropy shifting function 
 
     (1)  
/* from pool 1 
 
     (2)   
/* from pool 2 
 
     (3)                    
/* Entropy Shifting (adding Bi to Ai) Loops 
Function 2nd time 
 
     (4)  
/* 2nd Entropy Shifting (adding Bi to Ai) 
The Formation of Entropy Mixing: The 
inputs to this section of the EGT 
creation are outputs of Entropy 
Shifting Formation which are entropies 
D1 and D2. The key point in this 
segment of ECG is to strengthen the 
crypto key by mixing its inputs through 




This illustration is a sample result of 







The ETEA was evaluated on the 
criteria of Entropy level of the EGT 
using Runs Test, comparison of 
encryptions of both TEA and 
ETEASH, and Test of Avalanche 
Effect to examine its security level. 
4.1 Runs Test 
The randomness of a set of numbers 
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do not follow a known or particular 
sequence and the number of modes is 
to be minimally acceptable. Hence 
Runs test was carried out on, the mean, 
median, mode, and test value 
700000000 of the entropy. Our null 
hypothesis is that the entropy is 
random. Table  4 to Table 7 show the 
results. 
i. RUNS (MEAN) = Entropy 
ii. RUNS (MEDIAN) = Entropy 
iii. RUNS (MODE) = Entropy 
iv. RUNS (700000000) = Entropy 
 
. Mean: From Table 5, our test value 
(mean of entropy) is 683962874.91, of 
a total number of entropy values of 
2000. Cases less than the mean are 
1204 and cases greater than the mean 
are 796. The number of runs is 967. 
The null hypothesis is that our entropy 
is random if assumed significance level 
(Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) is greater than 
or equal to 0.05. 
ii. Median: From Table 6, our test 
value (median of entropy) is 
542508570.00, of the total number of 
entropy values of 2000. Cases less than 
median cases are 1000 and cases 
greater than the median cases are 1000. 
The number of runs is 1012. The null 
hypothesis is that our entropy is 
random if assumed significance level 
(Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) is greater than 
or equal to 0.05 
iii. Mode: From Table 7, our test value 
(mode of entropy) is 1409568548.00, 
of total number of cases greater than 
the mean are 796. Number of runs is 
967. Null hypothesis is that our entropy 
is random if assumed significance level 
(Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) is greater than 
or equal to 0.05. 
iv. Test Value (700000000.00): From 
Table 8, our test value is 
700000000.00, of total number of 
entropy values of 2000. Cases less than 














Table 5 Test – Mean 
Measuring Parameters Entropy 
Test Value (mean)             683962874.91 
Cases < Test Value 1204 
Cases ≥ Test Value 796 
Total Cases 2000 
Number of Runs 967 
Z .36 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .722 
Table 6. Test – Median 
Measuring Parameters Entropy 
Test Value (median)             542508570.00 
Cases < Test Value                             1000 
Cases ≥ Test Value                               1000 
Total Cases                                         2000 
Number of Runs                                   1012 
0Z .49 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .623 
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4.2 Tiny Encryption Algorithm versus 
Enhanced Tiny Encryption 
Algorithm 
 Table 9 shows encryption with TEA, while 
Table 10 shows encryption with ETEASH. 
Figure 12 is an encryption graph comparing 
TEA’s encryption with ETEASH’s 
encryption. Graph of TEA shows that it 
follows a pattern whose next direction is 
predictable, implying the “related key” 
weakness or feature of TEA, while the 
direction of ETEATH’s graph is not 
predictable implying the strength of the 
encryption keys. Figure 13, Figure 14 and 
Figure 15 show the Menu of ETEASH on 
Raspberry, Encryption and Decryption 
processes respectively. 
 
Table 7 Runs Test – Mode 
Measuring Parameters Entropy 
Test Value (mode)             1409568548.00 
Cases < Test Value                             1997 
Cases ≥ Test Value                               3 
Total Cases                                         2000 
Number of Runs                                   7 
Z .07 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .941 
Table 8 Runs Test – Value (700000000.00) 
Measuring Parameters Entropy 
Test Value (mode)             700000000.00 
Cases < Test Value                             1204 
Cases ≥ Test Value                               796 
Total Cases                                         2000 
Number of Runs                                   967 
Z .36 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .722 
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Table 9. Encryption with TEA 
 







(K0, K1, K2, K3) 
Message A 








































Oluwade, et al CJICT (2021) 8(2) 1-15  
URL: http://journals.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/index.php/cjict 





















Table 10. Encryption with the Developed ETEASH 
S/No Message AB Message A Message B Encryption Keys 
(K0, K1, K2, K3) 
Message A 
- Encrypted  















–1812734587I   –2002224107 
3 232481850 
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Figure 15. Decryption with ETEASH Encryption Keys 
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4.3. Test of Avalanche Effect on TEA 
and ETEASH crypto keys 
Avalanche effect in cryptography 
describes a concept in cryptography 
where little change in input values 
leads to a substantial change in the 
output. The standard TEA was passed 
through the avalanche test and the 
Enhanced TEA was also passed 
through the avalanche Test. Table 11 
shows the result of the avalanche effect 
for TEA’s encryption keys while Table 
12 shows the avalanche effect for 
ETEASH encryption keys. Table 13 
shows the marginal differences 
between TEA’s encryption keys and 
ETEASH’s encryption keys using the 
avalanche effect, which ultimately 
portrays that ETEASH passed the 
benchmark of Avalanche Test 
seamlessly compared to TEA. This 
indicates that the developed ETEASH 
encryption keys are stronger than 
TEA’s encryption keys. Figure 16 
shows the benchmarking of Avalanche 
Effects of ETEASH and TEA 
encryption keys, indicating that 
ETEASH’s crypto keys are stronger 























Figure 16. Benchmarking Avalanche Effects of ETEASH Crypto Keys and TEA crypto 
4.4. Comparison of Hardware Implementation ETEASH with other 
S-No. 
Address 
TEA ETEASH Marginal 
Differences 
1 48.44 56.25 7.80 
2 50.00 57.81 7.81 
3 53.13 57.81 4.68 
4 60.94 64.06 3.12 
5 50.00 56.25 6.25 
Ave. Total 262.51    292.18   29.66 
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Cryptographic Lightweight Algorithms 
A comparison of the hardware 
implementation of ETEASH   with other 
cryptographic algorithms is shown in Table 
14. The parameters for comparison are 
block size in bits, key size in bits, the code 
size and RAM size in bytes, and the cycle 




Table 14. Comparison of ETEASH with other Cryptographic Algorithms 
S/
N 





















1 AES             AVR 64 128 1570 – 2739 3579 (Poettering, 
2007) 
2 DES AVR 64 56 4314 –  8633 8154 (Thomas et al, 
2007) 







64 80 5230 328 17390 – (Woo et al, 
2008) 
5 RC5 Power 
TOSSI
M 
64 128 3288 72 70700 – (Woo et al, 
2008) 








AVR 64 96 1076 28 16457 22656 (Thomas et al, 
2012) 












64 64 826 22 3006 2984 (Muhammad et 
al 2017) 







64 128 3880 10003 5153 4828  (This work) 
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5. CONCLUSION  
IoT provides ease of connectivity and 
computing capability for everyday 
communication by ensuring effective 
data generation and exchange with 
minimal human intervention. Traditional 
cryptographic functions for mitigating 
malicious attacks cannot be applied to 
low-capacity devices. Therefore, the 
developed Enhanced TEA on Raspberry 
pi 3 provides encryption of information 
and credentials, securing the perception 
layer of smart home devices against 
related-key attacks. 
The work presented in this paper made 
the following contributions: 
a) The development of a Random 
Number Generator with Entropy 
Generation Technique was used in the 
Enhanced Tiny Encryption Algorithm for 
constrained devices. 
b) The development of Enhanced Tiny 
Encryption Algorithm for Secured Smart 
Home.  
Future work can be extended to the 
following areas:  
a) Authentication of packets received by 
a destination node from the source could 
be carried out, to further strengthen the 
security of the smart home, in case there 
is a malicious node within the HAN.  
b) This research utilized TEA as 
lightweight cryptography in securing the 
smart home with EGT. Other 
lightweights’ cryptographic algorithms 
could be explored.  
c) Other forms of entropy generation and 
management such as non-deterministic 
could be explored for better unpredictable 
key generation and management. 
 
REFERENCES  
Abdelhalim, M., El-Mahallawy, M. and A. 
Elhennawy, M. (2013). Design and 
Implementation of an Encryption 
Algorithm for use in RFID 
System. International Journal of RFID 
Security and Cryptography, 2(1), 
pp.51-57. 
Abdul-Ghani, H. A., Konstantas, D., & 
Mahyoub, M.  (2018). A comprehensive 
IoT attacks survey based on a building-
blocked reference model. IJACSA) 
International Journal of Advanced 
Computer Science and Applications, 355–
373. 
Abdulsalam, Y. S., Olaniyi, O. M., & 
Ahmed,A. (2018). Enhanced tiny 
encryption algorithm for secure electronic 
health authentication system. 
International Journal of Information 
Privacy, Security and Integrity, 3(3), 230–
252. 
Abu, M. A., Nordin, S. F., Suboh, M. Z., Yid, 
M. S. M., & Ramli, A. F. (2018). Design 
and Development of Home Security 
Systems based on Internet of Things Via 
Favoriot Platform. International Journal 
of Applied Engineering Research, 13(2), 
1253–1260. 
Ajao, L. A., Kolo, J. G., Adedokun, E. A., 
Olaniyi, O. M., Inalegwu, O. C., Abolade, 
S. K. A (2018). Smart door security-based 
home automation system: An Internet of 
Things. Scifed Journal of 
Telecommunication, 2(2), 1-9. 
Alagbe, V.,  Popoola S.I., Atayero, A.A.,  B 
Adebisi, B. Abolade R.O., Misra S. 
(2019)  Artificial Intelligence Techniques 
for Electrical Load Forecasting in Smart 
and Connected Communities. ). Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 
URL: http://journals.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/index.php/cjict 
15 
Oluwade, et al CJICT (2021) 8(2) 1-15  
 
11623   (pp. 219-230). Springer, 
Cham. https://link.springer.com/chap
ter/10.1007/978-3-030-24308-1_18 
Alharbi, A., Zohdy, M., Debnath, D., 
Olawoyin, R., & Corser, G. (2018). 
Sybil Attacks and Defenses in Internet 
of Things and Mobile Social 
Networks. International Journal of 
Computer Science Issues (IJCSI), 
15(6), 36–41. 
Ali, I., Sabir, S., & Ullah, Z. (2016). 
Internet of Things Security, Device 
Authentication and Access Control: A 
Review. 14(8), 11. 
Alizadeh M., Shayan, J., Zamani, M., & 
Khodadadi, T. (2012). Code analysis 
of lightweight encryption 
algorithms using in RFID systems to 
improve cipher performance. Paper
 presented at the Open Systems 
(ICOS), 2012 IEEE Conference. 
Aria S., Cong C. & Thomas E. (2014). 
AVRprince – AnEfficient 
Implementation of PRINCE
 for 8-bit Microprocessors. 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 
Worcester, MA, USA 
{ashahverdi,cchen3,teisenbarth}@wp
i.edu 
Bhosale, S. D., & Sonavane, S. S. (2018). 
Wormhole attack detection in internet 
of things. International Journal of 
Engineering & Technology, 7 (2.33) 
(2018) 749-751. Website: 
www.sciencepubco.com/index.php/IJ
ET   
Buenrostro, E., Cyrus, D., Le, T., & 
Emamian, V. (2018). Security of IoT 
Devices. Journal of Cyber Security 
Technology, 2(1), 1–13. 
Burhan, M., Rehman, R. A., Khan, B., & Kim, 
B.-S. (2018). IoT elements, layered 
architectures and security issues: A 
comprehensive survey. Sensors, 18(9), 
2796. 
Das, S. R., Chita, S., Peterson, N., Shirazi, B. 
A., & Bhadkamkar, M. (2011). Home 
automation and security for mobile 
devices. 2011 IEEE International 
Conference on Pervasive Computing and 
Communications Workshops (PERCOM 
Workshops), 141–146. 
De Leon, R. M., Sison, A. M., & Medina, R. P. 
(2019). A Modified Tiny Encryption 
Algorithm Using Key Rotation to 
Enhance Data Security for Internet of 
Things. 2019 International Conference on 
Information and Communications 
Technology (ICOIACT), 56–60. 
ElShafee, A., & Hamed, K. A. (2012). Design 
and implementation of a WIFI based 
home automation system. World Academy 
of Science, Engineering and Technology, 
68, 2177–2180. 
Hasan, R., Khan, M. M., Ashek, A., & Rumpa, 
I. J. (2015). Microcontroller Based Home 
Security System with GSM Technology. 
Open Journal of Safety Science and 
Technology, 5(02), 55. 
Hossain, M. K., Biswas, P., Mynuddin, M., & 
Morsalin, S. (2014). Design and 
implementation of smart home security 
system. International Journal of Modern 
Embedded System, 2(6), 7–10. 
Hughes, R., & Nordholt, J. (2016). 
Strengthening the security foundation of 
cryptography with Whitewood’s quantum-
powered entropy engine. January. 
Jing, Q., Vasilakos, A. V., Wan, J., Lu, J., & 
Qiu, D. (2014). Security of the Internet of 
URL: http://journals.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/index.php/cjict 
15 
Oluwade, et al CJICT (2021) 8(2) 1-15  
 
Things: Perspectives and challenges. 
Wireless Networks, 20(8), 2481–
2501. 
Jordi M. B., Athanasios V., & Mariusz G. 
(2017). Secure Smart Homes: 
Opportunities and Challenges. ACM 
Comput.Surv. 50, 5, Article 75 
(September 2017), 32 
pages.https://doi.org/10.1145/312281
6  
Karimi, K., & Krit, S. (2019). Smart home-
Smartphone Systems: Threats, 
Security Requirements and Open 
research Challenges. 2019 
International Conference of 
Computer Science and Renewable 
Energies (ICCSRE), 1–5. 
Kim, T. H.-J., Bauer, L., Newsome, J., 
Perrig, A., & Walker, J. (2011). 
Access right assignment mechanisms 
for secure home networks. Journal of 
Communications and Networks, 
13(2), 175–186. 
Kumar, K. V., Mascarenhas, S. J., Kumar, 
S., Rakesh, J. P. V., & Kumar, V. K. 
(2015). Design and implementation of 
Tiny encryption algorithm. 
International Journal of Engineering 
Research and Applications, ISSN, 
2248–9622. 
Kumar, R., & Mittal, P. (2019). A Novel 
Design and Implementation of Smart 
Home Security System: Future 
Perspective. International Journal of 
Applied Engineering Research, 14(2), 
363–368. 
Ling, Z., Luo, J., Xu, Y., Gao, C., Wu, K., 
& Fu, X. (2017). Security 
vulnerabilities of internet of things: A 
case study of the smart plug system. 
IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 4(6), 
1899–1909. 
Misra, S. A Step by Step Guide for Choosing 
Project Topics and Writing Research 
Papers in ICT Related Disciplines. 
In Information and Communication 
Technology and Applications: Third 
International Conference, ICTA 2020, 
Minna, Nigeria, November 24–27, 2020, 
Revised Selected Papers 3 (pp. 727-744). 
Springer International Publishing 
Muhammad  U, Irfan A, M, Imran A, & Shujaat 
K, & Usman A, S. (2017) SIT: A 
Lightweight Encryption Algorithm for 
Secure Internet of Things. International 
Journal of Advanced Computer Science 
and Applications, Vol. 8, No. 1, 
Oluwade O. R., Olaniyi O. M., Abdulsalam Y. 
S. & Ajao L.A (2018). Entropy 
Generation Technique In Lightweight 
Cryptographically Secured Smart Home. 
12th International Multi-Conference on 
Information Communication Technology 
Applications (AICTTRA, Obafemi 
Awolowo University) 
Oluwu M., Yinka-Banjo C., Misra S., Oluranti 
J. (2020). Internet of Things: 
Demystifying Smart Cities and 
Communities. Lecture Notes in Networks 




Pavithra, M. (2019). IOT Home Automation 
with PIR Sensor Security using ESP8266 
WI-FI Chip and GSM. 8(6), 5. 
Poettering, B. (2007). Rijndael furious aes-128 
implementation for avr devices. Retrieved 
from: http://point-at-
infinity.org/avraes/rijndaelfurious.asm, 
on 03/04/2020.  
URL: http://journals.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/index.php/cjict 
15 
Oluwade, et al CJICT (2021) 8(2) 1-15  
 
Popoola, S. I., Popoola, O. A., AI 
Oluwaranti, A. I. Atayero A.A., 
Badejo J.A., Misra S. (2018). A 
Cloud-Based Intelligent Toll 
Collection System for Smart 
Cities.  Communications in 
Computer and Information 
Science book series (CCIS, volume 
827 pp. 653-663). Springer, 
Singapore. https://rd.springer.com/ch
apter/10.1007/978-981-10-8657-1_50 
Raggett, D. (2016). Tackling Data Security 
and Privacy Challenges for the 
Internet of Things. Retrieved from 
W3C: https://www. w3. 
org/Talks/2016/0614-iot-security. 
pdf. 
Rambus. (2019). Smart Home: Threats and 
Countermeasures. Retrieved from 
Retrieved On March 29, 2020 from 
https://www.rambus.com/iot/smart-
home/  
Rao, T. A. (2018). Security challenges 
facing IoT layers and its protective 
measures. International Journal of 
Computer Applications, 975, 8887. 
Shaikh, E., Mohiuddin, I., & Manzoor, A. 
(2019). Internet of Things (IoT): 
Security and Privacy Threats. 2019 
2nd International Conference on 
Computer Applications & 
Information Security (ICCAIS), 1–6. 
Shifa, A., Asghar, M. N., Batool, N., & 
Fluery, M. (2019). Efficient 
Lightweight Encryption Algorithm 
for Smart Video Applications. ArXiv 
Preprint ArXiv:1901.08344. 
Shoeb, M., & Gupta, V. K. (2013). A crypt 
analysis of the tiny encryption 
algorithm in key generation. International 
Journal of Communication and Computer 
Technologies, 1(38). 
Souza L S, Misra S, & Soares M, S. (2020) 
SmartCitySysML: A SysML Profile for 
Smart Cities Applications. Lecture Notes 




Suchitra, C., & Vandana, C. P. (2016). Internet 
of things and security issues. International 
Journal of Computer Science and Mobile 
Computing, 5(1), 133–139. 
Thomas E., Christof P., Axel P., Sandeep K., 
and Leif U. (2007). A Survey of 
LightweightCryptography 
Implementations. Design and Test of ICs 
for Secure Embedded Computing. IEEE 
Design & Test of Computers.  
Thomas E., Zheng G., Stefan H., Sebastiaan I., 
Tomislav N., Thomas P., and Francesco 
R. (2012). Compact Implementation and 
Performance Evaluation of Block Ciphers 
in A Tiny Devices.  International 
Conference on Cryptology in Africa. 
Usman, M., Ahmed, I., Aslam, M. I., Khan, S., 
& Shah, U. A. (2017). SIT: A lightweight 
encryption algorithm for secure internet of 
things. ArXiv Preprint ArXiv:1704.08688. 
Vassilev, A. T., & Hall, T. (2014). The 
Importance of Entropy to Information 




Woo K. K., Hwaseong L., Yong H. K., and 
Dong H. L. (2008) Implementation and 
Analysis of Lightweight Cryptographic 
URL: http://journals.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/index.php/cjict 
15 
Oluwade, et al CJICT (2021) 8(2) 1-15  
 
Algorithm suitable for Wireless 
Sensor Networks. Information 
Security and Assurance, 2008. ISA 
2008. International Conference on 
IEEE.  
Yassein, M. B., Hmeidi, I., Shatnawi, F., 
Mardini, W., & Khamayseh, Y. 
(2019). Smart Home Is Not Smart 
Enough to Protect You-Protocols, 
Challenges and Open Issues. 
Procedia Computer Science, 160, 
134–141. 
Zandamela, A. A. (2017). An Approach to 
Smart Home Security System using 
Arduino. Electrical Engineering: An 
International Journal (EEIJ), 4(2/3), 
1–18. 
Zeadally, S., Das, A. K., & Sklavos, N. 
(2019). Cryptographic technologies 
and protocol standards for Internet of 
Things. Internet of Things, 100075. 
Zhang, J., Duong, T. Q., Woods, R., & 
Marshall, A. (2017). Securing 
wireless communications of the 
internet of things from the physical 
layer, an overview. Entropy, 19(8), 
420.  
 
 
 
